ser in terms of money (nearly one million dollars a month) but the fact that husbands and children failed to come home from the battle was costing him popularity at home.

In addition, the humiliation of being unable to defeat a backward army was too much for the Egyptian dictator to endure.

much for the Egyptian dictator to endure. He therefore decided to use a weapon long outlawed by all the nations of the world, poison gas! Soon Egyptian planes began regular bombing runs against Yemeni vilages. In January of this year, a raid on the town of Ktaf in Northern Yemen, killed 170 people. In the first week of January alone, the Royalists clamed that gas took the lives

of 493 Yemenis.
On February 15, another poison gas attack was launched, this time against the village of Beni Salamah in Southern Yemen. The continued reports were so obviously true that it led to debate in the British Parliament where Prime Minister Wilson declared that he had evidence "strongly suggesting that poison gas had been used" in Yemen.

On January 31 of this year, the Interna-tional Committee of the Red Cross took the unusual step of announcing its "concern over the alleged use of poisonous gas". It took the step despite lack of sufficient evidence because it was so completely convinced that the attacks had indeed occurred.

that the attacks had indeed occurred.

During this entire period the Cairo authorities vehemently denied that gas had been used by their troops. Despite this, the reports continued and grew in intensity. With the failure of any governmental agency to take action, private individuals made it their business to ascertain the truth or faisity of the gas stories. A number of individuals visited the area and confirmed in their minds that poison gas was indeed betheir minds that poison gas was indeed being used. They immediately sent private petitions to the United Nations Committee on Colonialism. Nothing more was heard of

on Coloniaism. Nothing more was heard of these petitions.

On March 7, the United States and Great Britain issued a blistering attack on the Committee. Lord Caradon, the permanent British delegate declared that a subcommittee that screened petitions to the 24-nation committee on colonialism had censored the private petitions and refused to circulate them to the committee because they were

critical of the United Arab Republic.
In an indignant statement, Richard Johnson, the United States representative de-clared that there apparently existed a double standard on the committee that permitted circulation of petitions critical of Western nations but not of Asian-Africans.

nations but not of Asian-Africans.

Despite this, no action was taken as the Communist-Asian-African bloc consisting of the Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq, India, Yugoslavia and Tanzania supported the subcommittee's actions. The United Nations failure to hear the charges was so blatant that even the Saudian Arablan delegate, Jamil M. Baroody, attacked Secretary General U Thant for refusing to do anything about these charges or about the entire Egyptian aggression in Yemen where over 100,000 persons had lost their lives.

But while the United Nations refused to act, another international agency was quietly

act, another international agency was quietly going about getting clear and irrefutable evidence.

The International Red Cross now sent a team of doctors to the town of Gahar in North Yemen following an appeal from the inhabitants who claimed to have been gassed on the morning of May 10, 1967. Their investigation was methodical and painstaking and a secret report was issued. The Jewish Press is in possession of this report.

The substance of the report follows:

The following statements were made by

shorty after the raid. They showed the following symptons: shortness of breath, coughing, pink foam at

the inhabitants who witnessed the incident: 1. Seventy-five persons died of poison gas

the mouth, general edema, especially the face; no physical injuries.

2. The undersigned doctors examined the four surviving victims and observed the following:

Subjective symptoms: burning eyes and trachea, internal thorax pain, extreme fatigue, anorexia.

Objective symptoms: dry cough, negative ausculation in two patients, sign of bronchitis in the other two, conjunctivitis, facial edema, no traumatic lesions, tympanum

, 3. The undersigned doctors examined a corpse four days after death and 12 hours after burial.

Immediately, the common grave was opened, and well before the corpses were visible, there was a sweet penetrating smell . . . The bodies showed no traumatic lesions. The skin was pink, Advanced and general edema all over the body.

Examination of lungs: reddish-brown

throughout, enlargement, consistence and fragility greatly increased, crepitation considerably reduced.

The undersigned doctors draw the follow-

ing logical conclusions from their findings: . . . The cause of death in the case of the corpse examined was pulmonary edema. The over-all consistency of the ICRO (Interna-tional Committee of the Red Cross) medical mission's findings shows that in all probability this pulmonary edema was caused by

inhalation of toxic gas.
(Signed) RAYMOND JANIN, ICRC Doctor-Delegate.
WILLY BRUTSCHIN, Doctor-Delegate.

Signed at town Najran, May 18, 1967.

A B M The ICBM Threat From China

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, August 7, 1967

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, there is serious concern about Red China's growing nuclear weapons capability.

As a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee I have felt compelled to speak out about this problem, such as in my statement to the House of Representatives June 13, 1967, on the fiscal year 1968 Defense appropriation bill, to emphasize that we must have action now to begin deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile—ABM—system.

Funding to begin deployment of the ABM system was provided in last year's Defense appropriation bill, and additional funds for this purpose are provided in the Defense appropriation bill currently pending in Congress. Secretary of Defense McNamara has, however, delayed ABM deployment.

The urgency of the situation has once again been underscored in the report just released by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Joint Committee found that Communist China may have a capability of attacking the United States with nuclear missiles within several years, possibly as early as 1970-71.

The Los Angeles Times, in a sobering assessment of the Red Chinese ICBM threat, calls for an immediate start on construction of an anti-ballistic-missile defense to counteract that threat. In reaching this conclusion the Times states that Secretary of Defense McNamara's reasons for delay in construction of antimissile system are overshadowed

by the rapid Chinese nuclear buildup. Under leave to extend my remarks, I submit this timely editorial for inclusion in the Record, because I know the subject is of great importance to the Congress and the entire Nation.

THE ICBM THREAT FROM CHINA

Based on information obtained from various intelligence agencies of the U.S. government, the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee now reports that Communist China may have the capability to fire nuclear missiles at the United States within three or four years' time. Although the committee feels any Chinese

Although the committee feels any Chinese attack in the early 1970s would be of "a low order of magnitude"—i.e., perhaps only two or three nuclear missiles—there is still substantial cause for concern. As of now this country does not possess an effective antimissile defense system. Even though a Chinese attack would be "suicidal" in terms of the destruction a U.S. nuclear response would involve, the committee wisely does not rule out the possibility of such an illogical move by Peking.

The committee report differs, if only semantically, from the publicly expressed

mantically, from the publicly expressed views of Defense Secretary McNamara, who believes that the Chinese will not have a "significant" missile capability until the mid-1970s.

The key word is, of course, significant, by which McNamara presumably means an ICBM force of 50 or 60 missiles. This belief does not rule out the possession by China, perhaps by the end of this decade, of an embryonic missile force capable of striking the United States.

the United States.

There is one view, also expressed by Mc-Namara, that the reliability of Chinese missiles in the 1970s would not be great, thereby reducing or even eliminating their military value. There are also some China specialists who argue that Peking wants a nuclear arsenal only for defensive or deterrent purposes, and for the great power status nuclear weapons carry. weapons carry.

No one can say for sure that these opinions are incorrect. But what must also be kept in mind is that U.S. officials have consistently erred in estimating the nuclear potential of China—as earlier they did with the Soviet Union. And, while China may be essentially defense-minded, there have been enough examples in Peking of what are, to the Western mind, irrational behavior pat-terns to preclude any positive judgments about what the Chinese may or may not do.

Given these considerations, it is imperative that the United States prepare for the worst. This means an immediate start on the construction of an antimissile system capable of counteracting a foreseeable Chinese ICBM threat.

Preparatory work on such a system has already been done, and reportedly there are funds in the defense budget directly tied to production of a system. But McNamara has hesitated before, despite congressional pres-sure, to go ahead with even a limited anti-missile defense.

There are many reasons for the defense secretary's caution, including economic and domestic political problems; for example, what areas such a system would cover. Also, the Administration is seeking agreement with the Soviets to limit deployment of what would be an extremely costly full-scale missile defense force.

These considerations, however, are overshadowed by the possible danger of a rapid Chinese nuclear buildup. American security requires a rapid start on deployment of a missile defense system adequate to meet the potential threat from China. MORI/CDF

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